Sat 31 May 2008
Game on. It is a testament to the circular nature of politics in Bangladesh that I used the same heading and same introduction to a column almost three years ago. The more things change, the more they stay the same. The dynamics are different now, of course, with both AL and BNP in the opposition, so to speak, but once again the issue is elections and whether or not to participate.
The official letters from the AL and BNP to the caretaker government, respectfully declining the invitations to participate in the ongoing dialogue about the upcoming elections, have not yet been mailed, but in all other respects, it is official: AL and BNP will not attend the dialogue, and more crucially, will not participate in the December elections unless their leaders are first freed.
In the wake of the strong statement opposing participation made by the grassroots and district level workers of the AL when they met earlier in the week, the decision to endorse this policy by the senior leadership of the central working committee is no surprise. Indeed, haven’t we all been bemoaning for years now the lack of internal party democracy within the AL? Well, this was internal party democracy in action.
The BNP decision to also boycott the talks and upcoming elections strikes one as a trifle opportunistic, in that until the AL had made its decision, the leader of the BNP had instructed her factotum to attend the talks. It was only after it became clear that the AL would not take part that the BNP followed suit. Nevertheless, this makes perfect sense: in the first place the party cannot allow it to seem as if the AL is a more staunch opponent of the current dispensation, and in the second, the party has learned to its cost that an election without the AL has limited legitimacy and utility.
However, whether the decision was a good one, is an entirely different question. On this count, there are misgivings, even among the senior leaderships of the political parties, especially the AL. After all, it is by no means clear what would be the outcome of the street showdown that is now looking increasingly likely. There is every chance that the political parties will be unable to prevail or that if they look like they are doing so that their actions will trigger a tougher crack-down.
Taking a different tack, aimed at going to elections, ensuring that the elections are free and fair, and then using the popular mandate as a springboard to free their leaders might have seemed a more sensible course of action.
Certainly, in the case of the AL, who are seen as the party most likely to prevail in free and fair elections, it seems as though the waiting game might have been a more prudent move.
Thus, there are whispers that while many of the party faithful are perfectly genuine in their belief that elections are not the way to go, that the decision not to participate was helped along by those who either have something to fear from elections or are in cahoots with the hard-liners looking for an excuse to crack down.
Where do we go from here? It is possible that there will still be a turn-around. Sheikh Hasina’s point has been made loud and clear. It remains beyond question that she retains the full support and loyalty of her party. In addition, she can now argue that it is she who is the moderating element within the party: you want an AL without me, she might now say, good luck controlling it.
Perhaps, having demonstrated her strength, she will be willing to accept some kind of a deal. The official AL line is that the cases against her are fabricated and must be withdrawn. But perhaps a “compassionate” release on medical grounds might be a compromise that is acceptable all round.
As for the BNP, they have a different outlook. It is true that the party has less to gain from free and fair elections; nevertheless, if it could use elections as a springboard to free its incarcerated leaders, that would be of significant benefit to the party. Indeed, a joint movement with the AL to re-institute the status quo ante, would help the party’s rehabilitation process considerably, and would leave it in a strong position to make a comeback.
If the entire tenure of the current caretaker government including the anti-corruption drive etc is discredited, the BNP has much more to gain from such a revision than the AL.
For the powers that be, the game is still very tense. There can be little doubt that there are many at the top who are looking towards a compromise and are willing to make concessions in order to deliver credible elections. The problem is that there are also elements who would prefer a showdown to any kind of compromise.
Who might these elements be? Hard-liners who feel that there can be no going back and no compromise, certainly not with the two ladies. They will be waiting to see the outcome of the showdown, in which they are confident that they can prevail, and counseling against any kind of accommodation or settlement.
Then there are those who might see their best bet as trying to claim the mantle of political restoration, perhaps reversing everything that has been done in the past year and a half. This might not be possible for the parties to do by themselves, but with tacit or even overt support, their chances of success would be far higher.
One imagines that this would most likely be unacceptable to the army rank and file, but a possible scenario might be for one faction to quietly take sides to help smooth the transition; maintaining enough control over the process such that the rank and file are kept happy, but quietly coming to an understanding with one or the other parties. The identity of which party would most likely to be chosen for such a partnership should give the other party pause for thought.
This would be the worst of all worlds, and we trust that such a move would be unacceptable, both to the general public, who surely have not sat patiently for the past 16 months only to see us return to precisely where we were prior to 1/11, as well as to those who have put their lives and reputations on the line for the past year and a half.
The biggest misapprehension the public has going into the coming showdown is that the powers that be are a unitary entity. They are not. As with any other entity in Bangladesh, there are currents and cross-currents and factions and counter-factions. Everything depends on which element ultimately gets to call the shots.
It is cards on the table time. Let’s see what everyone has got.
Zafar Sobhan
May 31st, 2008 at 11:14 pm
(1) “The BNP decision to also boycott the talks and upcoming elections strikes one as a trifle opportunistic, in that until the AL had made its decision, the leader of the BNP had instructed her factotum to attend the talks. It was only after it became clear that the AL would not take part that the BNP followed suit. Nevertheless, this makes perfect sense: in the first place the party cannot allow it to seem as if the AL is a more staunch opponent of the current dispensation, and in the second, the party has learned to its cost that an election without the AL has limited legitimacy and utility.”
Reply:
BNP is a very different kind of political party than AL. There are not that many dedicated Tofails, Razzaks, Suranjits or Motias in BNP. BNP is basically a coalition of vested interests made by Ziaur Rahman in 1979. When Zia was assasinated and Justice Abdus Sattar became the President in 1981 just before Ershad’s martial law, BNP was falling apart from inside as the coalition was breaking. It was at this point Khaleda Zia was dragged from her widowed domestic retreat to the leadership of BNP by some Zia loyalists to save the party.
Ershad again broke this coalition several times and with the exodus of many members of Zia’s BNP coalition, the Jatiya Party was formed. Barrister Moudud Ahmed (Ershad’s VP), Anisul Islam Mahmud etc. were all members of Zia’s BNP coalition. Therefore the heart and soul of BNP is basically with Begum Khaleda Zia in who’s absence BNP will cease to exist and its workers will move on elsewhere like JP.
BNP has no grassroot like AL or Jamat. This too contributes to its crisis of survival. I can understand why Major Hafizuddin of the army backed reformist BNP called the mainstream BNP Awami League’s ‘B’ team today. Does it not sound pathetic to Awami League ears?
It sounds Great to me. It sounds like the music of true political defeat of BNP. I believe BNP finally got the recognition of a genuine political party by becoming “Awami League’s ‘B’ team” (according to Maj. Hafiz). The army backed fake BNP finally recognized the coalition of BNP’s true democratic soul with the Awami League.
This ongoing honeymoon between AL and BNP mainstream also shows how well the lessons of 1/11 was learnt by both AL and BNP and how nicely they have learnt to live with one another. Had this come earlier the nation could be saved the consequences of 1/11.
(2) “However, whether the decision was a good one, is an entirely different question. On this count, there are misgivings, even among the senior leaderships of the political parties, especially the AL. After all, it is by no means clear what would be the outcome of the street showdown that is now looking increasingly likely. There is every chance that the political parties will be unable to prevail or that if they look like they are doing so that their actions will trigger a tougher crack-down.”
Reply:
I believe the “Shushils” who enlightened the nation in the interim might not prevail with their Grand ideas as they will face increasing pressures from the grassroots to either cooperate or perish. A situation where all major political parties with grassroots support have joined hands might not be like Jalil’s deadline gimmicks against the last regime. In this case, the international community could bypass the Shushils in becoming the most important player to push the crisis to a resolution. There is already a talk in Dhaka about cancelling the UN Peace-keeping contract of the army. The same thing that was done to trigger 1/11 by the diplomats of the time. This time the business community might join hands with the international community to ensure that there is no peacekeeping for the army. This could be really good news for the political parties and really bad news for the beneficiaries of the army backed CTG.
Looking beyond the crisis, BNP has no commitment to free its incarcerated leaders other than Khaleda Zia. Those who served in the government of the two BNP regimes are not the same people who ran the party. Neither does Khaleda or her sons have their good old dictatorial privileges. This is not because of the BNP workers but because of a genuine internal crisis of leadership in BNP since most of Tarek’s pathologically corrupt friends are now in jail and the few old and honest senior leaders of the party, leftovers from Zia’s time, are closer to their graves than to the halls of power.
June 1st, 2008 at 6:55 am
I liked the line ‘Well, this was internal party democracy in action.’
June 2nd, 2008 at 12:30 am
Based on pure speculation but some rational observations, I think that all the important cards have already been played. The brokering role of the current CTG has run its course; without a new deck of cards, my sense is that we are witnessing the last days of the Fakhruddin administration. The arrests of the BNP/Jamaat leaders just prior to the opening of the dialogue and the recent arrests of the low-level criminal elements of AL and BNP were vein attempts to assert who is the boss. This, too, will fail to resuscitate the current administration. All else remaining equal, I venture to speculate another change, perhaps with a more direct and visible takeover by the armed forces with a promise to hold some kind of election in a very short time frame. The principle element of CTG version 3 would be to replace the chief advisor with an ex-military to reassert its authoritarian role and stronger and visible link with the armed forces as opposed to the civil service. The new CTG will, most likely, release some rank and file leaders of AL and BNP currently in prison on condition that they must assure the participation of their respective parties in the pre-election dialogue. This will also re-open the door for the elusive “third option” to reassert itself as a genuine alternative amidst the new political chaos and hence will be welcomed by the CPD+ coalition and intellectual backers of 1/11. The first phase of the general election could take the form of a national referendum to introduce a Presidential form of government, perhaps with a bicameral legislature. All this has to be done in a rapid fire fashion because of the principle post 1/11 lesson that the window of opportunity does not remain open for long.
June 4th, 2008 at 8:11 am
Zafar, good analysis of what everyone wants. But, as anyone who has played poker seriously would tell you, one rarely shows their cards. You either fold if you think the stakes are too high and you haven’t got the goods, or you raise the ante and wait for the opponents to fold. Regardless of your hand, you seldom show what you’ve got.
It’s the same in politics. Having established her control over the party, why would Hasina want to show her hand now? Assuming that AL is likely to win a free and fair election (not a foregone conclusion, but that’s a different debate), Hasina would want an election, and she knows that the army will have eventually allow an election. Why not simply wait out the emergency?
As for Khaleda, as you say, more the regime and everything it has done is discredited, the better it is for her. So an andolon, whether it results in the toppling of the regime or crackdown, is better for her. In fact, if there is to be a crackdown, to quote Lenin, then the worse, the better - nothing will shed the regime’s civilian facade more than army open firing in Dhaka streets. But a premature andolon that is suppressed relatively quickly is of no use because it will be followed by things similar to what is described in comment 3. So surely for Khaleda the best alternative is to wait - she has already bore the brunt, how much worse could it get for her?
And for the regime, the minimum programme is indemnity, which it thinks is best served through controlling the presidency. A premature andolon would be a very good excuse for it to bypass the opposition and set up something similar to what is described in 3. But for this to happen, there has to be a false move by the politicians first.
To borrow from another western cliche, what we have is a Mexican stand off - like the one at the climax of ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’. Let’s hope that one of the character’s gun is empty so that we can have some survivor at the end of the shoot out.
Comment 1, ‘UN will cancel peacekeeping missions’ is a bogus line. UN missions matter lot more for the Fijian army, and this doesn’t stop Fiji from being a tin pot dictatorship. It’s not like UN gives our army peacekeeping roles as an act of charity. There really aren’t enough countries with sufficiently experienced armies that are acceptable to all major and regional powers. Bangladesh happens to be one such country. So our peacekeeping roles are quite safe. If the army wants to intervene in politics for whatever reason, ‘the UN made us do it’ may be a convenient excuse. But let’s not pretend that it is anything other than that.
June 7th, 2008 at 3:43 am
Ref: # 4:
(1)”UN missions matter lot more for the Fijian army, and this doesn’t stop Fiji from being a tin pot dictatorship.”
Reply:
Both Bangladesh and Fiji share similar dysfunctional military civilian relations and unconstitutional political history that we can neither afford to defend nor afford to be unapologetic.
(2) “It’s not like UN gives our army peacekeeping roles as an act of charity.”
Reply:
It’s actually the other way around — our sovereignty is mortgaged by the army just to earn foreign exchange by taking up peace-keeping positions. This is called exporting military manpower or exporting defense.
(3) “There really aren’t enough countries with sufficiently experienced armies that are acceptable to all major and regional powers. Bangladesh happens to be one such country.”
Reply:
Bangladesh does not have the quality of highly trained and well equipped professional army like Pakistan that receive millions of dollars, latest combat machineries and training from the US and to chase Al Qaeda in their border with Afghanistan. Pakistan is another country that also contributes to international peacekeeping but with a much higher quality of input than our poorly trained and poorly equipped soldiers who rarely fight real wars. A few war games on Chittagong Hill Tracts does not make a professional army.
(4) “So our peacekeeping roles are quite safe.”
Reply:
I believe our peacekeeper exports through UN are at best an international trade in defense manpower and at worst an invitation to the international community to motgage our soverignty. Defense is actually the last thing any country can sell. It is like selling the blood of your men and women in uniform to support international political disputes of third parties or rogue nation states.
(5)”If the army wants to intervene in politics for whatever reason, ‘the UN made us do it’ may be a convenient excuse. But let’s not pretend that it is anything other than that.”
Reply:
It is high time to determine the opitimal size of our armed forces based on our defense requirements. I believe we should cut the size of our army into half and retire half the officers, who are demoralized since 15th August, 1975, to destabilize the country through coup and martial law. General Moyeen was a simple Major in Ershad’s Martial Law who was demoralized since then to do the kind of thing he did in 1/11. The excuse of UN was made available by the diplomatic community to trigger the coup instead of Moyeen’s simply making it up. There should be serious consideration of deportation orders for the representatives of diplomatic missions that co-planned and co-executed the coup. If Zimbabwe can do it, there is no reason why we should so modestly invite Anglo American imperialism to abuse our sovereignty and overthrow our established constitutional order in the name of the people and for the fun of regime change which is not a matter of joke for the people of Bangladesh. We cannot allow our sovereignty to be slaughtered casually either by the blissful Shushills or by the representatives of other countries.
June 7th, 2008 at 5:11 am
Number 5, I think you’re missing my point. My argument is this - our army’s peacekeeping role is not a barrier to its meddling in political affairs. In Jan 2007, the excuse given for the intervention was ‘UN would cancel our peacekeeping role if we enforced a one party election, so we had to intervene’. I contend that this excuse was bogus. Army’s reasons for the coup were domestic. Some intervened because they are after power. Some thought 22 Jan election would have led to civil war. Some genuinely believe in the anti-corruption drive. We can judge the intervention for itself without referring to the bogus UN excuse.
The relevant point here is that the UN / international community has much less leverage over the army than what we usually think. If there are talks of cancelling peacekeeping jobs, they are bluff, and Moeen and his friends will call the bluff. Oppositition to the regime won’t come through foreign diplomats, it will have to be homegrown. Do we think AL-BNP are capable of it is a debate worth having, for example.
As for the rest of your comment, I should note two things:
1. The regular readers would know I neither defend nor apologise for the coup. Here is what I wrote on the anniversary of the coup, and my thoughts haven’t changed:
http://jrahman.wordpress.com/2008/01/11/wont-get-fooled-again/#more-77
2. We will have to have a serious discussion about how we can practically demilitarise our polity. But Zimbabwe is not an example I’d choose, no matter how much pseudo ‘anti imperialist’ mumbo jumbo is used.
1/11 didn’t happen because the army was warned that enforcing a one-party election would have hurt its peacekeeping