This post continues the theme of possible actions that could improve our politics post emergency, assuming a free and fair election with everyone’s participation occurs. In what follows, I make the case for devolution, by which I mean elected local governments (district, municipal, upazilla, union councils) with wideranging responsibilities resulting in a devolution of political power from Dhaka to the local levels. I list general aruments for and against devolution before finishing with a discussion on what local government election might mean in the current political environment. Looking forward to a good discussion (please keep comments relevant - blanket statements like ‘politicians are corrupt / dynasties must be banned’ have very little value, and will be moderated).

Before proceeding any further, we should note the history of local government in Bangladesh. Elected local governments with limited responsibility - union councils consisting of a dozen or so villages - were first introduced during the Raj. After liberation, the Bakshal system envisaged devolution of power to district councils, each headed by a zilla governor. Bakshal was of course a one party system, and the governors were appointed by the president. Ziaur Rahman instituted gram shorkars, but these were also not elected. Ershad brought in the upazilla system, whereby considerable power were given to directly elected upazilla councils. But the councils lacked legitimacy because of their association with Ershad’s dictatorship. After restoration of democracy, the first Khaleda government dissolved the upazilla system, and while Awami League revived them, upazilla elections did not take place under either parties, even though both promised them in the 2001 election. For a broader discussion, see this Banglapedia article.

What this history suggests is that devolution of power to strong local government has never happened in Bangladesh. The current regime is toying with local government elections before or concurrent with the parliamentary election. Meanwhile, a committee appointed by the regime has proposed significant reform of local bodies - details are available here, and should be discussed vigorously. It is in this context that I write this post. I am well aware of the pitfalls of a less-than-ideal exit strategy. I’ll return to this issue towards the end of the post.

Benefits of devolution

1. Devolution makes for an inherently more democratic system.

Much of people’s day-to-day interaction with the government - provision of services, maintenance of the law and order - happens at the local level. If the local government is run by unelected bureaucrats appointed by the central government, then regardless of how representative the central government is, at the grass root level we don’t have democracy.

2. Devolution leads to increased accountability.

If an elected chairman does not do his or her job well, they can be reproached immediately. For example, any elected chairman who finds himself embroiled in a fertiliser or seed disbursement scandal (as some former BNP MPs were accused of) will find it very hard to hide from his or her voters - unlike MPs, local chairmen or councillors don’t have the luxury of living in Dhaka.

3. Devolution leads to the possibility of new leadership.

Volumes have been written about the need for new political leadership. Asif sums up the prospect of a new leader well with this sentence: A new bangladeshi obama will not rise out of a daily star roundtable or the cantonment but more from the very grassroots (see here). But, without local government, what kind of local leadership will arise? Asif talks about Rabbani of Kansat - undoubtedly an inspiring figure. But he failed to get a nomination from the Grand Alliance in the aborted Jan 2007 election. If there was an elected Kansat upazilla council, Rabbani could be its chairman. If mayors Hanif or Mohiuddin had significant power, could they not withstand national leadership in face of blunders and follies? I contend that devolution will provide a much more likely avenue for a new leadership than any legal maneuvering by the regime.

4. Devolution will allow for peacefull co-existence by ending winner-takes-all politics.

Talukder Maniruzzaman ends his ‘The Bangladesh revolution and its aftermath’ with this sentence: For the long run development of viable civilian institutions, the … political leaders of Bangladesh would … have to… forsake … ‘winner takes all’ games.. That book was first published in 1980. I noted in my very first post in UV that our winner-takes-all political system, and not the personalities of the two former PMs or corrupt politicians or some ridiculous notion of national shortcomings, was the fundamental reason behind the political crisis that led to 1/11 (see here). I contend that the most effective way of giving the opposition a stake in governance.

Consider this, in none of the past three elections did the winning side receive over 50% of votes cast, and in each case the winning side beat the losing side with a less than 5% margin. If the losing side in each election had responsibility for running a third to half of the 500 or so upazilla/municipal/city councils, would they have continued the andolon culture?

5. Devolution will change the debate.

Farid Bakht wants to change the debate
from being one about a Dhanmondi vs Banani (vs Cantonment) horse race to something that includes the farmer and the landless (and I’d also throw in the small trader and the mofussil dwellers). I contend that grassroot politicians with executive experience in running local governments is the most effective way of ensuring that the debate changes.

Arguments against devolution

1. Devolution is costly.

This was the argument put forward by former finance minister Saifur Rahman - where is the money going to come from to pay for these local councils? I’d retort using Farid Bakht’s words: where is the money going? Devolution should allow the government to shed bureaucratic fat in the secretariat. Also, local governments ought to be empowered with revenue raising powers.

2. Devolution will diminish powers of MPs.

This was the argument of Nazmul Huda, who headed a committee on the issue during the first Khaleda government. While this is true, I contend that this is a good thing.

What is a typical MP in the current system expected to do? He (and rarely she) is expected to beef-barrel. His re-election is dependent on how many culverts are built, how many mosques have been renovated, how the relief has been distributed or how the fertilisers have been disbursed. He gets to have a say in the local cricket clubs and cultural functions, and I’ve been told by a former MP, arbitrate on disputes (salish) including marital problems.

Devolution will mean that the local MP shaheb will lose these powers to the chairman and members. But is that a bad thing? Are MPs supposed to be marriage counsellors?

As long as the MP’s reelection depends on disbursement of wheats and fertiliser, he will not focus on the committee work that Asif and Jalal bhai recommend. Devolution will allow the MPs to be legislators, and that’s a good thing.

3. Devolution will lead to further criminalisation of politics.

This is a more serious argument. For example, the recent local government elections in West Bengal - with far stronger democratic tradition than us - saw serious violence (see here). However, the argument against devolution based on ‘undesirable people might get elected’ is really an argument against democracy as such.

4. Devolution will lead to ‘reactionary’ policies.

Of all the general arguments against devolution, this is perhaps the most serious. It is quite likely that Jamaat and other Islam-pasand parties can win control of a number of upazillas if an election were held today. It is quite conceivable that they’ll institute a range of social policies that hurts liberal-progressive sensibilities at the best, and are downright discriminatory at the worst. For example, an Islamist-controlled upazilla council could make hijab compulsory.

However, such fears may be overblown. Firstly, voters can be the best judge of a government - this is as true for upazillas as for national government. In Pakistan, Islamists were voted out of power in Baluchistan and Sarhad because they concentrated more on banning music than running the provinces. Why should it be any different in Jessore and Jaipurhat? And far more importantly, liberal-progressives need to convince the majority of the merits of their values - enforcing these values from seminar rooms in Dhaka won’t work.

Local government election now?

Some fear that local government elections before the parliamentary election will be used to prop up a a king’s party that will assist the exit of the current regime and the entry of a new king. This is essentially what Ershad did - hold upazilla elections, get opportunists elected as chairmen and members, and form Jatiya Party. Notwithstanding the very real risk of history repeating itself, a few things can be noted.

1. The argument that we should oppose local government election because some ambitious general can use it as a prop is similar to arguing we should oppose war crimes trial because a trial will help Awami League politically.

2. The regime could use a far worse legitimising device than local government election. Elected upazilla councils would produce the abovementioned benefits. What if they decided to hold a referendum where 99% voted ‘yes’?

3. It’s not clear that an Ershad-style upazilla election will work today. People are much more aware, and it is much easier to ‘minus’ a few dozen national figures than outlaw thousands of grass root figures.

4. When all is said and done, the current political crisis will be resolved in Dhaka, with the major players being Dhanmondi, Banani and Cantonment. If we head towards confrontation and andolon, upazilla election won’t save regime. If we head towards palace deals, upazillas won’t needed by the powers-that-be. And if we have genuine elections, then we may as well have them at local levels as well as nationally.