National Security Council — Who is asking for it?
Not the general public.
Nor the politicians.
Nor any professional bodies.
Yesterday a roundtable of random people (failed politicians, the reform party, 51 first class giving professor and passed sell by date intellectuals) urged for the formation of NSC. Those who are familiar with pattern of making laws and ordinances without any discussion or transparency now know that the standard formula is this.
1. Ask a professor to present a keynote paper favouring what you want.
2. Have a roundtable of people who are used to boot licking.
3. Call it “Gonodabi” and make the law.
In case of NSC, the first two has been concluded. The first paper calling for NSC was presented by Imtiaz Ahmed. Yesterday, the round table happened.
Last time, NSC was called for in Bangladesh was by Gen Ershad in February 1982, a month before the overthrowing of President Sattar, when Ershad wanted an institutional role for the miliary in Bangladesh for policy making.
Read the three news reports and you will get the gist.
Prothom Alo
Daily Star
New Nation
Who was present? The line up has the best of military bootlickers.
The organization which organized it also is a just floated organization and I am sure it will disappear after this meeting of after the passing of NSC ordinance.
The key note speaker was professor Ataur Rahman from the political science department. Does the name sound familiar? Remember the time when Gen Moeen U Ahmed a gave speech for the future of democracy in Bangladesh at the invitation of a no name organization. Yeap, it was headed by the same guy.
Mizanur Rahman Shellly — advisor to the previous two military dictator Gen Ershad and Gen Zia.
ASM Abdur Rab — the previous domisticated pet opposition leader from 1988 under Ershad. When every single party boycotted election. He participated in election to become the leader only to agree with everything dictator ershad said.
Dr. M A Matin - the leader of the Kings party under Ershad and who is in political wilderness
Journalist Sadeq Khan - the big Jamat backer and supported every single martial law that happened in the country.
Osman Farooq - the incompetent education minister from the BNP regime
…. and the list goes on and on.
Here are some of the choice quotes:
Ataur Rahman said formation of the NSC is necessary to ensure internal security, including food and energy, and to protect national security.
“We do not want to see the recurrence of 1/11 changeover by the military,” he said adding, contribution of military can be institutionalised and democracy can be restored through formation of the NSC comprising co-ordinated leadership. He said formation of such a body is not contrary to the Constitution.
Someone please ask the good old pol-sci professor to give us an example of another country where in stead of the police force, a security council is needed to ensure internal security. Secondly, since when a security council is used to decide on food and energy issues? With lots of deals on coal and energy involving a lot of cash coming up, this should raise the red flags on any one’s mind, if it hasn’t yet.
Former minister and BNP leader M Osman Faruk said such a civilian military platform would be able to participate in policy making.
He underlined the need for deciding the goals of NSC first, then to take measures to give it a constitutional shape
This is interesting because this is a politician from the upcoming Kings party who is asking for the parliament to step back and let this unelected council do the policy making. If you are wondering and looking for instances for such arrangements, you won’t find any because this is coming from the same guy whose other name is political expediency.
BJP leader Dr MA Matin said formation of a NSC is logical since the experiences of previous four Parliaments are not so comfortable.
He said the design of the proposed NSC has to be determined in view of the socio-economic political conditions of the country.
So the ‘leader’ who lost every single free election held after 1990, is now giving us sermons of democracy. Note he is also asking it to be created as an alternative to the not so comfortable parliament.
I saved the best for last for sure.
JSD President ASM Abdur Rab said there is no alternative of formation of National Security Council involving the Armed Forces.
Formation of BAKSAL, proclamation of state of emergency and emergence of 1/11 change over would not have happened, if there was a participatory rule involving army and other professionals, he observed.
So what is the takeaway? Not a single person opposed this idea in the round table and because of the “jonorole”, the government will “have to” consider building same new ordinance putting in NSC.
If you haven’t seen this editorial yet, please read. Stop this insanity. We must resist NSC if we want any semblance of future or growth for our democracy. Reform can not be forced. Neither can it be made permanent without the buying in of the parties. Rather as the article says: Bangladesh does not have an external security crisis to require the setup of an NSC. We have a political crisis that requires a political solution based on strengthening democracy, not one that creates a set of non-democratic institutions. So we need to recognise the proposal for an NSC for what it mainly is: it’s an exit and entry strategy.
The five dangers of a National Security Council
Sikder Haseeb Khan
WITHOUT oversight by elected representatives, the caretaker government is considering some permanent institutional changes in Bangladesh. Among these, the most prominent proposal now is to form a National Security Council (NSC), which would become the top authority to deal with security issues.
The proposal was floated two months into emergency rule, in March 2007. By December, the Law Ministry had reportedly prepared a draft on a potential 24-member structure of the NSC. The army chief reasoned recently: “It’s [the NSC] there in India and Pakistan — so why not in Bangladesh?”
However attractive it may be made to look on paper, the creation of a non-democratic authority on security would be disastrous for Bangladesh. In countries where democracy is already weak, NSCs have been a guise to establish the policy supremacy of the military over elected authorities. So the five dangers outlined below are neither hypothetical nor far-fetched; they are real.
Danger 1: NSC will control internal law and order. In countries like Pakistan or Turkey, a possible rationale exists about having an NSC, since these countries face complex and compelling threats from their external environments. Bangladesh has no external enemies threatening its survival. The reality is that an NSC in Bangladesh will be used to maintain and enforce internal security, providing cover for the many coercive agencies that already exist, such as the police, RAB, BDR, and so forth. Furthermore, as the experience of other weak democracies show, the NSC will likely operate outside judicial oversight. To strengthen our democracy, we need greater accountability for law enforcement — and creation of an NSC will be a big step away from that direction.
Danger 2: NSC will see politics as a threat. Let me put it simply: “Give a man a hammer, and everything will start to look like a nail.” Once it is focused internally, the NSC will be able to interpret anything that it does not like as a threat. There may be legitimate security issues from time to time, but what will happen most often is that political opposition to policies favored by the NSC will be seen as a security threat. In all weak democracies, the NSC has weakened democracy further by blurring the line between the freedom and threats, eventually resulting in situations where the state begins to view parts of its own citizens as enemy number one. This becomes a downward spiral: the more that threats are constructed and sold to the public, the more entrenched the NSC becomes. So, a security council may even increase conflict in society.
Danger 3: NSC will protect human rights abusers. We already have enough human rights abuses resulting from the government’s heavy hand. Getting justice is extremely difficult; those trying to secure accountability for extra-judicial murders know this. The formation of an NSC will provide a shelter at the highest level for rights abusers. This has happened in Pakistan. The NSC will also protect those groups that it sees as allies.
Danger 4: NSC will not be accountable to elected authority. The NSC’s formation is being accelerated to take advantage of the absence of elected authority. No announcement so far places the NSC directly under political authority. It will become at least a parallel authority to elected politicians, or worse, as a superior authority constituted by the president. There will some political representation on the council, but that representation will probably be used to convey the NSC’s wishes, rather than the other way around. There will be no popular oversight on the NSC. Once created in this way, the NSC cannot be undone easily.
Danger 5: NSC will politicise the military. The most influential members in the NSC will be from the armed forces: the three service chiefs, the paramilitary chiefs, the intelligence agencies, and their associates. This institutional role of the military in policymaking, combined with a focus on internal security, will quickly involve military decision-makers in political controversies. This will compromise the professionalism of the military, and militarize professional policymaking. Do we really want a Pakistanisation of Bangladesh’s civil institutions?
Bangladesh does not have an external security crisis to require the setup of an NSC. We have a political crisis that requires a political solution based on strengthening democracy, not one that creates a set of non-democratic institutions. So we need to recognise the proposal for an NSC for what it mainly is: it’s an exit and entry strategy.
March 30th, 2008 at 3:07 pm
It is important to get an unedited transcript of the round table.
The three reports ( Published in newspapers blindly supporting General Moeen’s Government) stated here were edited to give a sense that there was a consensus on NSC.
This and this reports will give a different look at the round table. Even people quoted in this post were in fact reported to have expressed reservations about the proposed NSC.
[The second link will be inactivated soon.]
March 30th, 2008 at 5:41 pm
I’m not in favor of Care-taker government as it’s agaisnt the spirit of democracy. I’m in favor of National Guardian Council[NGC] instead of National Security Council. And that council must not have any executive power in day-to-day functioning of government, what will be in the domain of elected democratic government of people. But they will have the role in extra-ordinary situation likes pre-1/11 states, or any national security and sovereignty issues likes declaring war or extremely important global issues like whether to support or not to support like the Bush-war etc.
The NGC members will be comprised of 15-21 members, automatically selected by dint of their positions in the different services and professions. It will be headed by chief justice, chiefs of three forces, Dhaka university VC, Khatib of national mosque, president of minority religious groups or assoications, leader of business groups, cabinet secretary, home-secretary, president of associations of lawyers, doctors, engineers, agriculturists, journalists etc.
There is no need for care-taker government. Instead there will be strong independent election commission. In extreme extra-ordinary situation NGC can recommend the president to dissolve ministry or parliament. They can also take over the power temporarily for fresh-election and restitute democoratic parliamentary government if once elected government has to be dissolved in extreme politial dead-lock. And that decision must to uninamious and endorsed by 90% members of NGC. They will also have yearly meeting and review of the government’s job and can send sepecific recommendations, [not any mandate for governement to implement].
They can serve as the role of reserve/shadow emergent government if political government and opposition fail to discharge their solemn duties as deemed by their electorates. That will cut fine balance between position and opposition and also a strong deterent for elected government to turn to elected-dictatorialship.
Thanks.
March 30th, 2008 at 6:51 pm
If a NSC was actually formed, would it better the chances of an election being held by the end of 2008? Would it give the architects of 1/11 the level of reassurance they needed to go ahead with holding elections?
If a NSC was actually formed, would that mean that, to use euphemisms liberally, senior military officials upholding the spirit of 1/11 will not be as interested to take over the top office of the Republic for the next ten years or so? They could somehow be persuaded to leverage their influence more indirectly through the NSC?
I ask because it seems to me that the idea of the NSC is a response to a part of the original 1/11 plan that could not be brought to fruition.
March 30th, 2008 at 7:38 pm
May be, but what is the point of having an election then since they will be dictated by a bunch of few good men. Once passed, will it be ever be able to be withdrawn? NSC, as a compromise formula, will be another train wreck like the concept of caretaker government. Temporary band aids causing long term heartache.
It was quite interesting to note the comment of the US deputy ambassador. This means NSC has the blessing of the US State department.
March 30th, 2008 at 7:58 pm
The other thing is that people who are thinking that they will negotiate their way out after the election using NSC, Kings party, ACcountability commission, are ignoring and underestimating what Rumi bhai calls the ‘Manna Factor’ – the power of the general mass who are quite hardpressed. I think the only alternative for them now is to meet with parties and agree on an accord that there will be certain things the parties will have to carry on after election. But in principle the parties should not agree on NSC. Even if this is the only exit strategy that is agreed to by the 1/11 leaders, the NSC can perhaps come with an expiry date after one year. If the parties actually continue with some of things they want the elected governments that the govt want them to continue with, then the NSC can expire quietly. But this is an extremely dangerous proposition. As i said, with every passing day, the current govt is losing their negotiating power. The grassroots of the parties can smell the unpopularity of this lame duck government. The path to confrontation helps no one. The sooner, the power holders realize the potential of the Manna Factor, the better it is for them and for the country.
March 30th, 2008 at 8:20 pm
Asif bhai, I agree with you in #6, and that is why, I think, we really need to very carefully consider where we’re going. The grassroots are slowly swinging towards a confrontation with the government. If it comes, that confrontation will become quiet ugly.
Maybe it’s naive optimism, but on my part, I think that the NSC will quietly wither away by itself in a couple of years. The Armed Forces Division currently does what the NSC would do anyways.
I was quite bemused by the messages of caution that senior BNP and AL leaders are mouthing nowadays when confronted with demands of movements by the grassroots. If they had shown one-tenth of this much moderation and caution the last sixteen years, we would not be in this sorry mess now.
March 31st, 2008 at 11:53 am
The National Security Council is coming. Without it the armed forces’ role cannot be legitimized, and quite a few top level army officers feel, rightly or wrongly, that it’ll prove to be a restraining influence on the ‘willful’ behaviour of the political parties, and that the nation cannot be repeatedly ‘rescued’ from the brink as happened on 1/11.
Whatever has to be done to bring about the NSC will be done, perhaps with some modifications along the way. The coming local elections are a dry run (in terms of ‘clean’ candidate selection - though clean in whose eyes is a different matter - bypassing in quite an overt manner local organizations of the two national level parties, warning the top politicos not to make any noises about the manner or timing of the elections, making stricter the watchdog supervisory role of the army/intelligence bodies over the civilian governmental machinery at the local level, negotiating extensive backroom deals concerning the two netris, etc. - for the big one later on.
The whole plan and process has been gummed up by the unexpected economic downturn and the consequent crush on middle and lower income wage earners, but the long-term goal of institutionalizing the army’s role in national politics remains intact. As long as this muted version of the Man on the Horseback syndrome can be brought about in a ‘tactful’ manner i.e. without major political opposition, the donor agencies, specially the World Bank as well as the Yanks in Foggy Bottom with whom the CTG have good connections and a common political vocabulary, have lent the idea their unstinting support, while publicly making noises about the withdrawal of emergency and the holding of elections. Even the European liberals manning, and womanning, Brussels, despite some fears that the change won’t be painless, basically support the idea and will pour money to make it feasible.
April 1st, 2008 at 3:10 pm
I pesonally believe that the National Security Council proposal is a timely suggestion to ensure our security challenges are addressed better. Please note that security challenges transcend borders, particularly in the age of religious militancy. Both AL and BNP have pandered to the fundamentalists, as evident form their support from IOJ/Jamaat and Khelafast Majlish respectively. We have seen how groups like the JMB terrriozed people. Moreover, corruption, etc. remain key security challrnes affecting the health of the state. The NSC will serve as a platform in which all stakeholders canget togrther and ensure Bangladesh remains a stable stage able to meet its security challenges. The NSC wil be another crucial and praisewrothy step tobe initiated by the reformist caretaekr government, including the fight against religious militancy, corruption, strenthening of EC and extending mobile facilities in CHT- decisions that corrupt and inefficient governments run by political goondas and chamchs will never take.
April 2nd, 2008 at 12:19 am
I’m linking this discussion with some questions raised by Hijibijbij here: http://www.drishtipat.org/blog/2008/03/20/nsc/#comment-151186
To quote Hijibijbij:
“Instead of just shooting down the NSC, can anyone suggest **anything** constructive that is (a) a way forward and (b) is practical+possible (i.e. allows current power brokers to exit safely - otherwise they won’t and it’s not a practical solution) and (c) also sets up reasonable safeguards against a repeat of 1/11?”
Let’s take these one at a time:
a) Way forward.
The stated goal is an election by the end of the year. If nothing changes between April and November, then is there any reason to suspend the election? Will the regime say that ‘anti-corruption drive hasn’t come to an end, so we won’t allow election’? Will the EC say ‘parties haven’t reformed themselves, so no election’?
I don’t believe the answers to either question is ‘yes’. If the regime does so, it will face both international opprobrium and domestic uprising. Our generals are not like those of Burma. And much more importantly, because the rank and file of the army is drawn from the same middle class that forms political activists, I don’t think the army will crack down on a demonstration involving 5 lakh people.
So, if nothing happens, there will be an election by the end of the year. That’s the baseline scenario.
b) Safe exit strategy for the current regime.
An election cannot a guarantee of a safe exit strategy. We’ve seen three examples in the past 6 months - Thailand, Pakistan and Zimbabwe - where election results upset all pre-election calculations and manipulations by the ruling mob. So, if the regime thinks it can pre-arrange the outcome of the election, then it’s probably miscalculating.
This is probably why NSC is being formed. The idea is this: let there be an election, we’ll try to get our favourites over the line, but even if we can’t, we have this council to save ourselves from any retribution.
But will this work? If there is an opposition alliance before election, that will have a landslide victory comparable to 1954 or 1970. Even if the parties get together after the election - as in Pakistan - they’ll probably have a 2/3rds majority collectively. With that kind of win, what will stop Hasina-Khaleda’s chosen leaders to simply tear up NSC after the election? So, I don’t think NSC is a safe exit strategy at all.
What then is a safe exit strategy? Given the reality of election, I think there are two options:
i. Cut a deal with some politician with enough public support (actual public support, someone who can deliver at least 100 seats in an open election).
ii. Forget about political manipulation and focus on the election process. A successful election will give the regime enough political capital that it can use to negotiate its safety with the election-winners.
Of course the 2nd option is better for the nation. But even the 1st option is better than the NSC.
c) Safeguards against a repeat of 1/11.
1/11 didn’t happen because of Hasina-Khaleda’s personal enemity or the inate corrupt nature of politicians etc. It’s popycock and balderdash to believe that nonsense. 1/11 happened because of the centralisation of power, because of winner takes all system. There are plenty of ways other than NSC to decentralise power, some requiring constitutional amendments, some not:
- term limits,
- remove Article 70,
- empower parliamentary committees,
- elected local governments with power over development budget etc.
However, none of these will help with the regime’s exit strategy. And similarly, if we didn’t do at least some of these, 15 years later we’ll have to contend with another 1/11, NSC or not.
April 2nd, 2008 at 1:18 am
Judicial report on the DU incident has been published.
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=30373
April 3rd, 2008 at 5:36 am
“The report criticised Dhaka University Teachers’ Association for supporting the students protest, which it said was not based on any ideology.
“Teachers made provocative speeches to put the students and army and law enforcement agencies face to face to tarnish the image of the army,” it observed.”………Whoever has supported the DU teacher’s activities during the riot need to overhaul their corrupt mentalities and all public university teachers and students who were involved in the provocation and vandalism need to be locked up again.
April 6th, 2008 at 8:02 am
“Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and action, cooperate to public good…. It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics which is false in fact.”
David Hume wrote this in the 18th century. The idea is simple. If there were good men in charge, any system of governance would work fine. But what if there are bad men in charge? A good political system is that where even bad men in power cannot do much damage because they are kept in check. Who will keep the NSC in check?
April 14th, 2008 at 3:15 am
Jyoti (#9) - Thanks for responding to my questions. I’ve been traveling with little internet access - else would have replied much sooner.
(b) You suggest:
“i. Cut a deal with some politician with enough public support (actual public support, someone who can deliver at least 100 seats in an open election).”
And ignore Khaleda/Hasina? Not possible - and should not be done. We cannot ignore the two former elected prime ministers of the country. I assume you are simply listing this option for the sake of listing it rather than one you recommend. Please suggest only options that you would seriously recommend.
“ii. Forget about political manipulation and focus on the election process. A successful election will give the regime enough political capital that it can use to negotiate its safety with the election-winners.”
A successful election would mean immediate transfer of power. If the regime has dwindling political capital now, it will have none to negative (vengeance motive by politicos) after the election. By pushing for a deadline for the election, the political parties are playing their hand brilliantly right now - with a deadline, the CTG has no negotiating room left. You think they will have more ability to negotiate after an election? Really?
(c) I think certain institutional reforms are being put in place already - separation of judiciary, local elections under EC’s power rather than government’s are two that come to mind immediately. Further institutional reforms may be done and their permanent implementation (by extracting a promise from the parties that they will ratify these changes in parliament) will reduce the likelihood of a 1/11. But, as you say, these don’t add up to an exit strategy - and, I think, that’s still needed.
My question, then, remains - what is practical+possible (i.e. allows current power brokers to exit safely - otherwise they won’t and it’s not a practical solution) and also sets up reasonable safeguards against a repeat of 1/11?
April 14th, 2008 at 9:04 pm
There is none. You can not have both at the same time: as long as the current power brokers exit safely, their example will always tempt other people to try for another coup. On the other hand, an “unsafe” exit for the power brokers will not necessarily stop them from repeating either, but, it will make clear to succeeding generations the difficulty of getting down from a tiger after you’re done riding it.
April 15th, 2008 at 9:50 am
Hijibijbi (13),
First let’s note where we agree: there are things that can be done to prevent another 1/11 15 years later; these things don’t include an NSC; and some of these are being taken.
Now let’s move to the areas of possible disagreements.
First, I don’t think it is the case that the current powerbrokers won’t exit without a guaranteed safe exit strategy. As I said, the baseline scenario is an election. If the current set of powerbrokers - the generals that brought 1/11 - refuse to hold an election, there will be international pressure and domestic violence, and I simply don’t see army tanks killing thousands of people in Dhaka street. So the current powerbrokers have a rather weak hand to play with. ‘No election’ is not an option.
Given this, what would I seriously recommend? I’d seriously recommend both options outlined in 9.
Now, where did I say that Hasina-Khaleda ought to be bypassed or ignored? If the reality is that there is no one else in Bangladesh who can deliver 100+ seats, then the regime will have to cut a deal with either of them. And then it will have to take the chance that the party they cut the deal with is the one that wins the election.
The ideal will be a deal with both netris that will be followed by a genuine election. As part of the deal, the generals who ‘delivered us from 1/10′ will be given indemnity, and the parties will promise to enact decentralisation of power. If the regime delivers a free election, it will have the political capital to insist that the winner of the election keeps its end of the bargain.
You know, this has happened in Bangladesh once before. Both AL and BNP promised a ’sovereign parliament’ during the anti-Ershad uprising. But BNP was formally committed to a presidential system, and given Khaleda’s acknowledged popularity against Hasina, could have disregarded its pledge and gone for a presidential election in 1991. Instead, BNP agreed to revert to parliamentary system because it didn’t want to be seen as the ‘jatiyo beimaan’. I don’t see how a genuine national accord now will be any different.
But if there is no national accord, then the regime will just have to take its chances with one of the parties. The alternative is not a safe exit. The alternative is street violence followed by a countercoup.