Thu 24 Jan 2008
New Age Editorial Today:
Editorial
Lessons to learn from Thai army’s admitted misadventure
It is hardly surprising that the military council, which ousted former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 in a coup, accusing him of corruption and irreverence towards the Thai monarchy, and governed the country for the past two years, has proved entirely inept at running state affairs. So much so, in fact, that the council has promised that ‘there will be no more coups,’ as a Thaksin-backed political party prepares to assume office after the country’s recent elections, according to a report published in New Age on Wednesday. What is surprising, however, is that the Thai military has acquired the wisdom to recognise that ‘the military should not be involved in politics’ as the council’s spokesperson told reporters on Tuesday.
The Council for National Security has been widely derided in Thailand over the past two years for its inability to handle the country’s economic and social issues. Even though the council accused Thaksin of rampant corruption, they have so far only been able to prove one of the cases against him in court, and have had his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) political party’s senior leadership disbanded and banned from political activity for five years. Thaksin himself is living in exile, facing imprisonment if he returns to Thailand, but this has not decimated his popularity in predominantly rural Thailand. Thaksin supporters and activists joined the almost defunct PPP en masse and, on a pro-Thaksin platform, have fallen just short of gaining an overall parliamentary majority in the recent elections. While Thaksin’s regime is widely accused of corruption, his tenure as prime minister also saw unprecedented economic prosperity in rural Thailand.
There are important lessons to be learnt from these international experiences with military interventions into the polity, especially in South Asia, and specifically in Bangladesh. The concept of political and socio-economic reforms imposed in a top-down method, while undoubtedly tempting, is also heavily weighed down by historical proof of its utter lack of success. In Nepal, the frustration and animosity that ordinary Nepalis felt towards corrupt political parties ultimately led to their popular support for a state of emergency which made way for King Gyanendra’s dictatorial rule in 2005. That violent and autocratic regime ultimately had to be toppled by a popular uprising in the spring of 2006. In Pakistan, popular support for General Musharraf’s 1999 coup has not only led to his destructive and polarising autocracy, it has paved the way for the largest contingent of radical Islamist parties in the Pakistani parliament. As lessons may be learnt from the processes through which such top-down reforms are instituted, so lessons should be learnt from the outcomes of such attempts. .
January 25th, 2008 at 4:25 am
And here is what the Economist says
—-
Good riddance
Jan 24th 2008
From The Economist print edition
After allowing Thailand’s election winners to keep their prize, the generals should take their final bow
THE blundering soldiers who deposed Thailand’s prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, in 2006 seem at last to have got something right. This week saw the restoration of an elected government following last month’s election. Barring further mishap, the country seems back on the road to liberal multiparty democracy. This would be good news for the 65m Thais and would set an encouraging example for their fellow half-billion South-East Asians and the billion or more Chinese to their north. None of this, however, implies that Thailand’s generals are enlightened guardians who served the national interest; still less that their coup was justified.
The junta tried its utmost to thwart the relatively benign outcome that now seems possible. It had Mr Thaksin and more than 100 colleagues banned from politics for five years. His Thai Rak Thai party was dissolved. It re-formed as the People’s Power Party (PPP) and, to the generals’ dismay, won far more seats than any other party in the election, just shy of an outright majority. The Thai people—particularly the rural poor who benefited from Mr Thaksin’s development policies—spoke loudly. They told the military-royalist elite in Bangkok that, for all his faults, they still wanted Mr Thaksin, or a like-minded alternative. Samak Sundaravej, the PPP’s fiercely right-wing leader, who cheerfully admitted to being Mr Thaksin’s “proxy”, was this week poised to become prime minister, at the head of a six-party coalition.
Legal shenanigans since the election might still have frustrated the people’s choice. The Election Commission held an extravagant number of inquiries into allegations of vote-fiddling, mainly directed at the PPP. And the Supreme Court decided to hear several cases calling for the party’s election victory to be annulled. Whether or not there was any undue pressure on these institutions, they did the right thing in the end. Not enough candidates have been disqualified or made to re-run polls to stop the election winners taking office. And the Supreme Court, sensibly, rejected the idea that the PPP itself should be banned. Further cases are pending in various tribunals but so far the omens look good.
The new government should have a workable majority—but not a crushing one like those Mr Thaksin previously enjoyed. The opposition Democrats have done a lot better than in the past two elections, so parliament may see more vigorous debate. The Election Commission has shown itself vigilant enough to suggest that Thailand’s endemic vote-buying will become harder to get away with. Overall, Thai democracy stands a chance of emerging from the mess in decent shape.
It is not out of the woods yet, however. The political system is prone to too much fiery anger, wild accusation and vicious name-calling, and Mr Samak is a particularly bad offender. There are also worries he might bring back some of Mr Thaksin’s worst policies, such as a “war on drugs” (see article) that appeared to sanction extra-judicial murder. Mr Thaksin’s planned return from exile brings other worries. His wife is home already and has been bailed—having pleaded not guilty—in a land-fraud case brought by an army-backed corruption inquiry. Mr Thaksin himself, relishing his victory, might orchestrate some sort of vengeance against the coupmakers, causing fresh unrest. Better, perhaps, if he keeps his promise to quit politics forever.
The last post
Better still for General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the coup leader, and his fellow junta members to retire gracefully, forswearing political meddling to enjoy the amnesty they granted themselves. With luck, Thailand’s political elite has tired of its internecine strife, and normal parliamentary politics are about to resume. The many “liberals” who despised Mr Thaksin and applauded the coup may argue that this vindicates them. Nonsense. Not only did the coupmakers fail to produce the damning evidence of corruption and abuse of power that they needed to justify removing an elected government by force. Worse, they lowered the bar for other disgruntled soldiers seeing political squabbles or corruption allegations as an excuse to seize power—not just in Thailand but in places, such as the Philippines, where democracy remains a delicate blossom.
The coupmakers failed because the interim government of bureaucrats and retired soldiers they appointed did a rotten job. This, and the uncertainty over how the junta would get out of the mess it had created, consigned the country to more than a year of slower growth. As coups almost always do, this one caused more problems than it solved.
—–
The last paragraph has an eerily familiar ring to anyone in touch with Bangladesh.