Tazreena Sajjad wrote the following after attending an event in Washington DC last week.
It has some very interesting insights worth exploring. Thanks Tazreena for sharing this with us.

D.C. has, for the most part, remained quiet about the recent spate of
political events in Bangladesh. Not surprising of course. There are a
slew of issues around which lectures and talks take place, and the
developments in Bangladesh have not demanded a public forum for
discussion. Nevertheless, sponsored by the U.S. Bangladesh Advisory
Council and the South Asian Studies in Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, the
Bangladeshi expatriate community came together for a discussion on
Bangladesh: A Democracy in Crisis. The panelists included Stanley
Kochanek, Professor Emeritus at Pennsylvania State University, Dr.
Gowher Rizvi, director of the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance
and Innovation at Harvard University and Dr Junaid Ahmad, Sector
Manager for decentralization, local government reform and state
formation in South Asia for the World Bank. The event was moderated
by Ambassador William Milam, who served as the U.S. Ambassador from
1990-1993 and is now the Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.

The audience was an interesting mix of members of the US- Bangladesh
Advisory Council, professors of and from Bangladesh and the rest of
South Asia, individuals interested in civil-military relations, the
usual handful students and members of the Bangladesh expat community
and several former Ambassadors to Bangladesh as well as the former
Bangladesh ambassador to the US. I outline the boring details of the
audience to give a general sense of the atmosphere and the kind of
interest the situation in the country is transpiring amongst south
Asian enthusiasts. At the same time, I use it as an entry point to
voice some of my understanding of the situation and my concerns as a
citizen.

While following the news of how the CTG is strategically
metamorphosizing its role from a benign daddy-long-legs to a not-so-
benign dictator with amorphous designs, I have tried to understand
the role of the military in the political and civil affairs of weak
democracies. I identify four conditions which allow for a generally
smooth entry of the military into domestic and civilian affairs:
(i) First, the entrance of the military is a clear
indication of the lack of order in society. The military, which is
the antithesis of disorder, uses this as the first legitimate
rationale for freezing political movements in a country and imposing
emergency laws through which it can establish the rule of law and
‘clear house’.
(ii) Second, they make a claim to make a short-term entry
to bring about long-term changes;
(iii) Third, the hierarchical nature and robust structure of
the military inspires fear, admiration and respect for the general
population whose national memory is more determined by political
disruptions than the smooth running of political mechanisms. After
all, when there are no alternative structures which are accountable
to the people, they might believe that perhaps the military has some
answers.
(iv) There is a fervent hope, in all quarters, that this
time around, promises made will be promises kept.
(v) And finally, and often most compellingly, people tend
to believe that ‘the democratic formula has failed; we need the
discipline of the military to straighten out every single social and
political ill that are the remnants of older regimes’.

I outline the most salient factors that were brought up in the
discussion and which evokes my personal interest.

First, in the history of military coup in Bangladesh, is there
something different about this recent takeover? Is there a new wave
of change, transitional change that is being brought about in
Bangladesh, a point of hope, despite the recent banishment of two of
the most prominent (albeit equally problematic) political leaders
from the national scene? The tragedy lies in the fact that although
this is a point of change and challenge for the Bangladesh population
and civil society, the rhetoric of the military is much the same at
the point of any takeover. From Pakistan to Fiji, the promise of
change is what is given, expected and yet not quite delivered because
of the stagnancy of political processes as a consequence of such an
intervention. Perhaps then, it is our short-lived memory that
prevents us from immediately remembering our past experiences with
the military and in the euphoria of gaining stability, we forget to
regard such a move with healthy skepticism.

Second, there needs to be some reflection on how the decision to
exile one political leader and bar another to return to the country
translates into the will of the military to restore the country to
democracy. Surely, if the army was truly vested in due process, it
would allow Hasina to actually come back to the country and face the
criminal charges against her, recognizing that there is a risk of her
incendiary remarks causing agitation in the nation? At the same time,
does house arrest and exiling political leaders not create the
grounds for gaining legitimacy for political groups that demand
political space? Hasina, sooner than later, will be considered a
hero, and in some circles she may well be. A brave woman, a political
leader who, instead of running away wishes to face criminal charges.
Can the world demand less of a hero? At some point, she might be a
poster child for democracy. Cynicism aside, I am concerned that such
actions undermine the legitimate grounds which the army is trying to
pave to ‘ensure a smooth democratic transition’; barring political
leaders is not a positive indication of a regime trying to make way
for change. It indicates sinister designs on power accumulation and
consolidation over which the civilian population has little say or
control. Needless to point out, it also plays into Hasina’s need to
portray herself as a martyr.

Third, there seems to be confusion in some circles about the role of
the UN and the alleged pressure it has put on the Bangladesh army to
hasten the take over. These rumours may or may not be confirmed, even
if spread though publications such as the economist, but the
perception of external pressures and rationale for the deep-seated
level of military engagement raises questions about intervention, its
scale, depth and legitimacy. There is also a second element to this.
There are concerns about whether Bangladesh army’s role as
international peacekeepers can play a moderating role in the current
crisis and whether that may or may not be used as a point of leverage
by international actors, especially the UN. Examples from Pakistan,
Fiji and Nepal indicate that they may not be the case. Nevertheless,
peacekeepers in the international arena and dictators on the domestic
front raises questions about what kind of military is being fostered
by the political culture of the country.

The general sense I got from the audience is that no one is opposed
to the military take over given the constant political haranguing
between the political parties and the level of corruption that has
been corroding the country’s economy and image. Exhaustion with the
existing political parties, their constant bickerings and their
misuse of political processes have significant roles to play in this.
If change is to come through military means, people are willing to
see what that change brings. The question of concern is perhaps more
about where to move from here. Bangladesh, in many ways, is not a
political failure. The shifts and transitions in power has more or
less followed constitutional guidelines; the political failure of the
country lies in holding the democratic processes hostage instead of
strengthening them, not necessarily in the political formula that the
country has already enshrined in its constitution. Democratic tools
exist; it’s a question of taking ownership of them and pressing for
the wheels of these institutions and processes to embed themselves
not only in the nation’s psyche but in the dynamics of what makes the
country works. In this, the role of the judiciary and the rule of law
are critical; the role of the Bangladeshi population for demanding
accountability through better oiled machinery is essential. Far from
being relegated to the realms of being only an electoral democracy,
this is a time to perhaps push for an entrenched democratic culture,
not just democratic institutions. Irrespective of what levels of
support the army might garner even today, an institution functioning
under emergency laws and with full impunity is not a comforting one.
Sooner than later, Bangladeshis will wake up to this reality.

Finally, there is a need for a military that can take firm steps not
just to clean house but also know when to return to its defensive
role, which does not involve civilian matters. Perhaps we need a
military responsive, responsible and subordinate to civilian control,
not the other way around. History has pointed out that a military
that wishes to establish the rule of law by bypassing it is not doing
democracy a service. It is sowing the seeds for its destruction.
Perhaps this is where the Bangladeshi people, both home and abroad
need to press upon. We need not only to look for other political
options in terms of parties, but exercise our will and right to claim
the country back for democratic principles to take root.

To quote Dr. Ahmad: “we don’t need another troop surge”.